University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2019

A Place for Place in Federal Tax Law
Daniel J. Hemel
dangelolawlib+danielhemel@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Hemel, "A Place for Place in Federal Tax Law", Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics, No. 888 (2019).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

A Place for Place in Federal Tax Law
Daniel Hemel*
Drive about 14 miles west from here on Ohio State Route 81 and just when
you cross I-75, before entering downtown Lima, you will find that you have arrived
in a different capital gains tax regime. The grass may not be greener on the other
side of I-75, but the capital gains tax rules surely are. If you sell a capital asset at a
gain and plow the proceeds into an investment here in Ada, you will owe capital
gains tax today and potentially will owe more tax when you sell the Ada asset in the
future. If you put the proceeds into an investment in downtown Lima instead, you
can potentially defer capital gains tax until 2026, reduce your taxable income by 15
percent, and avoid any capital gains tax when you ultimately liquidate your Limabased holdings.
Downtown Lima is home to a new opportunity zone created under the
December 2017 tax law.1 And it is not the only nearby location where this strange
new regime applies. Drive east for 35 miles on U.S. Route 30 and you will arrive at
another one of these opportunity zones in Upper Sandusky. You can find another
one 40 miles to the northeast, just past Findlay, and yet another east of there in
Tiffin. All in all, 320 census tracts across Ohio—in 73 of the state’s 88 counties—are
now federally designated opportunity zones where investments are potentially
subject to much more complicated, but more generous, capital gains tax rules.2
The opportunity zone provision of the 2017 tax law is one of the most
significant experiments with place-based taxation in federal tax history. It is not
the first such effort: the now-expired empowerment zone program, established by
Congress in 1993, was an earlier, narrower—and in many respects, better
targeted—effort at spatial differentiation in federal taxation.3 Several other ongoing
federal tax programs—including the Low Income Housing Tax Credit and the New
Markets Tax Credit—also have strong spatial components.4 But while place-based
taxation is not new, its expansion as part of the 2017 tax law provides an opportune
moment to assess what role, if any, geographically differentiated rules ought to play
in a tax system that otherwise follows a norm of formal equality with respect to
individuals and firms in different domestic locations.
The 2017 tax law’s space odyssey is, I will argue, unlikely to be a successful
mission in its own right. The new opportunity zones are virtually no one’s idea of
*Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. These remarks were delivered at the
Ohio Northern University Law Review 42nd Annual Law Review Symposium. For insightful
comments, the author thanks Ethan Ames, Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Darien Shanske, Elaine
Waterhouse-Wilson, and the editors of the Ohio Northern University Law Review.
1 Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13823, 131 Stat. 2054, 2183.
2 See Opportunity Zones, OHIO DEV. SERVS. AGENCY,
https://development.ohio.gov/bs/bs_censustracts.htm (last visited June 24, 2019).
3 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
4 I.R.C. §§ 42, 45D.
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sound tax policy. The legislation is so poorly designed that one wonders whether the
flaws might have been intentional: whether this was simply a cynical attempt to
give tax breaks to rich donors and more work to well-connected lawyers, all under
the guise of aid to distressed communities. I am not yet convinced that the cynical
story is right, but not so sure it is wrong either. It is difficult to see how anyone who
genuinely sought to lift up communities left behind by the recovery from the Great
Recession would have written the law this way.
Yet the design flaws of the opportunity zone program do not (necessarily)
augur the failure of all place-based federal tax policies. There are, I will argue, a
number of ways in which spatial differentiation can plausibly improve the federal
tax system, both on dimensions of efficiency and of equity. An optimistic scenario is
that the December 2017 law’s foray into spatially differentiated taxation will draw
our attention toward more productive uses of place in federal tax policy. But one
must don rose-colored glasses in order to glimpse such a scenario, because the
opportunity zone program before our eyes inspires little confidence.
My talk today will examine spatially differentiated federal taxation in three
parts. The first part will provide a definition of place-based taxation and a
description of previous spatially differentiated federal tax programs. The second
part will consider the opportunity zone provisions of the December 2017 tax law,
outlining their key features and highlighting their deepest flaws. The third part will
sketch a number of more promising paths for place-based federal tax policy.
I.
I’ll start with a definition. A tax rule is spatially differentiated—or, to say the
same thing in fewer syllables, place-based—if its application depends upon the
geographic sites at which persons reside, properties are located, or activities occur.
Spatial differentiation can—in theory—take a near-infinite number of forms. It
might take the form of different exemption amounts or rate structures for taxpayers
who reside in different locations. It might take the form of different credits or
depreciation schedules for firms that purchase or deploy assets in different areas.
Any tax rule can become a spatially differentiated tax rule simply by adjusting its
application on the basis of location.
That’s what spatial differentiation is—here’s what it is not. Spatial
differentiation is not the same as interjurisdictional variation. The top state income
tax rate here in Ohio is 4.997%.5 Over the border in Indiana, the state income tax
rate is a flat 3.23%.6 That’s interjurisdictional variation, not spatial differentiation.
Interjurisdictional variation is foreordained in a federalist system that allows
states—and subdivisions within a state—to exercise discretion over their tax rates
and bases. Spatial differentiation, by contrast, is not inevitable. It is easy to

Taxes in Ohio, TAX FOUND., https://taxfoundation.org/state/ohio (last visited July 14, 2019).
Taxes in Indiana, TAX FOUND., https://taxfoundation.org/state/indiana (last visited July 14,
2019).
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imagine a system that grants each state the freedom to structure its own tax regime
but applies the same rules to all taxpayers at the national level.
Spatial differentiation is also not the same as spatial redistribution, though it
will often have that effect. Spatial redistribution occurs when the tax system
transfers resources from taxpayers in one location to taxpayers in another. Spatial
redistribution is a byproduct of a tax system characterized by progressivity in a
country characterized by spatial inequality. A graduated rate structure will result
in redistribution from the richest states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York) to
the poorest states (Mississippi, West Virginia, New Mexico).7 Specific provisions—
like the new $10,000 cap on the state and local tax deduction, or “SALT”—will also
have different impacts in different places.8 The 2017 tax law certainly leads to
spatial redistribution—as have revenue statutes throughout U.S. history. That is
not unusual. What is more unusual about the 2017 tax law is its explicit spatial
differentiation.
Unusual, but not unprecedented. Prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, federal
tax law did explicitly differentiate on the basis of geography in a number of
different ways.9
First, and least remarkably, federal tax law draws spatial distinctions that
track international boundary lines. Section 871 imposes a tax on income earned by
nonresident aliens inside the United States but not outside.10 A number of other
provisions make similar inside-outside distinctions.11 Some amount of
differentiation along international boundary lines is the necessary byproduct of a
Westphalian system in which each nation-state exercises exclusive sovereignty over
a limited territory. Indeed, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the U.S. tax
system’s spatial differentiation along international boundary lines is how little of it
there is: the United States is unique in applying its tax laws to its own citizens
wherever they are.12
Second, within the territorial limits of the United States, federal tax law
differentiates between the 50 states and the District of Columbia, on the one hand,
and the unincorporated territories, on the other. Most residents of unincorporated
territories such as Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam do not pay
See Release Tables: Per Capita Income by State, Annual, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release/tables?rid=151&eid=257197 (last visited Aug. 9, 2019) (2017
data).
8 Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2085.
9 The Uniformity Clause of the federal Constitution provides that “all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In a
somewhat confusing confluence of statements, the Supreme Court has said that the Uniformity
Clause also applies to taxes, but that explicit geographic distinctions in federal tax law are
nonetheless consistent with the clause as long as they do not reflect “an undue preference” for
one state over others. See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 80 n.9, 85-86 (1983).
10 I.R.C. § 871.
11 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 874 (special rules for deductions and credits for nonresident aliens); I.R.C. §
911 (partial exclusion of income earned by U.S. citizens and residents living abroad).
12 See Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 172 (2016).
7
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federal individual income tax on income from inside those territories.13 This
exemption is sometimes explained as what the territories get for giving up votes in
the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Electoral College.14 As someone
who was born in the District of Columbia and resided there immediately before
moving to Chicago, I feel obliged to add that this justification for territorial
exemption only aggravates D.C. residents, who also do not send a voting delegation
to Congress. The fact that D.C. residents also pay more per capita in federal income
tax than residents of any of the 50 states15 further fuels the outrage expressed on
the District’s standard-issue license plates, which now read “End Taxation Without
Representation.”
But our topic today is not taxation on the basis of representation—it is
taxation on the basis of location. And prior to the December 2017 tax law, a number
of federal tax provisions incorporated quite explicit spatial components.
One of those is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, or “LIHTC,” first
enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.16 The LIHTC program provides tax
credits over a 10-year period to investors in residential real estate developments
that house low-income tenants. In the normal course, the credits cover up to 70% of
the costs of building and rehabilitating low-income units. That figure rises to 91% if
the building is in a high-poverty census tract or in a zip code that has high
construction, land, and utility costs relative to area median income.17
A curious feature of the spatial differentiation embedded in the LIHTC
program is that these two criteria—high poverty and high cost—seem to be at crosspurposes with each other. High-poverty areas tend to be the places where land is
cheap; high-cost areas tend to be places where poverty is low. Since either high
poverty or high cost can be a trigger for the souped-up credit, the net effect of these
provisions is to incentivize LIHTC projects to locate either in the poorest parts of
town or in the richest. Thus, developments in the Watts area of Los Angeles—where
nearly 40% of the population lives below the poverty line—are eligible for the
enhanced credit, but so too are developments in the famously wealthy Beverly Hills
90210 zip code.18

I.R.C. §§ 931, 933.
See, e.g., 164 Cong. Rec. H9399 (Sept. 28, 2018) (statement of Del. Norton) (“[T]he reason that
most of the territories don’t come forward and ask for statehood is very clear. There is a quid
pro quo for them. In exchange for not paying Federal taxes, they don’t have the votes in
Congress.”).
15 Stephen Ohlemacher, Which State Sends Most Taxes to DC? Hint: It’s Not a State, ASSOC.
PRESS (Apr. 16, 2017), https://apnews.com/bb851fbec8e7463cbef631abd070888a.
16 I.R.C. § 42; see Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, tit. II, § 252(a), 100 Stat. 2189.
17 I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B).
18 See 2019 IRS Section 42(d)(5)(B); Qualified Census Tracts (2019),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/Datasets/qct/QCT2019M.PDF (listing census tracts 2420.00,
2422.00, 2423.00 2427.00, 2430.00, and 2431.00); I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B) Metropolitan Difficult
Development Areas (2019), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/Datasets/qct/DDA2019M.PDF
(listing 90210 area code).
13
14
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Because building a low-income housing development in a high-cost area is
much harder than siting it in a high-poverty neighborhood, the spatial
differentiation within LIHTC primarily pushes developers toward alreadyimpoverished places. This aspect of LIHTC has generated quite a bit of criticism.19
The concern is that by encouraging developers to pack more low-income families
into already low-income neighborhoods, LIHTC contributes to the concentration of
poverty and exacerbates existing patterns of economic and racial segregation.
Defenders of LIHTC’s spatially differentiated incentives have a response to
this critique. They point out that through much of the 20th century, federal policies
such as mortgage “redlining” diverted investment away from low-income, largely
minority communities. Defenders of LIHTC’s spatially differentiated incentives can
argue that the preference since the late 1980s for development in high-poverty
areas acts as a corrective to the decades of disinvestment that preceded the
program.20 They can also point to evidence that links LIHTC-backed projects in
high-poverty areas to higher property values and lower crime rates.21 More
generally, they can argue that the primary problem plaguing high-poverty areas is
not that they have too many poor people; it’s that they have too little capital. In this
view, channeling capital investment toward high-poverty areas is precisely what
federal policy ought to be doing.
The next major spatially differentiated tax legislation came in the first year
of the Clinton administration, when Congress established the “empowerment zone”
program as part of the 1993 omnibus budget bill.22 Roughly 100 high-poverty, highunemployment communities were designated under the program as empowerment
zones. Businesses in empowerment zones received a number of targeted tax
incentives. Chief among them was a credit of up to $3000 for each worker they
employed who lived inside the zone. The program cost the federal government
approximately $2.5 billion over its first decade,23 a drop in the bucket compared to
LIHTC, which carries a price tag over $9 billion per year.24

See, e.g., Michelle D. Layser, How Federal Tax Law Rewards Housing Segregation, 93 IND.
L.J. 915 (2018).
20 See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, Is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit “Keeping Cities Segregated”?,
MEDIUM: WHATEVER SOURCE DERIVED (July 3, 2017), https://medium.com/whatever-sourcederived/is-the-low-income-housing-tax-credit-keeping-cities-segregated-9cbcc819e241.
21 See Rebecca Diamond & Tim McQuade, Who Wants Affordable Housing in Their Backyard?
An Equilibrium Analysis of Low-Income Property Development, 127 J. POL. ECON. 1063 (2019).
22 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–66, tit. XIII, § 13301, 107 Stat.
543–554 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1391–1397).
23 Matias Busso & Patrick Kline, Do Local Economic Development Programs Work? Evidence
from the Federal Empowerment Zone Program 7 (Nat’l Burea of Econ. Research, Working Paper,
July 22, 2008), https://www.nber.org/conferences/2008/si2008/PERE/busso.pdf.
24 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, JCX-81-18, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for
Fiscal Years 2018-2022, 25 (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5148.
19
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Several studies have scrutinized the empowerment zone program, which
expired at the end of 2017.25 The available evidence suggests that the program did,
as intended, generate additional jobs inside empowerment zones, but at a very high
price: each new position came at a revenue cost to the federal government of over
$100,000.26 Some of these jobs may simply have been shifted from locations outside
the zones. And on top of that, the small boost to employment inside empowerment
zones came with a sharp increase in rents. Much of the benefit of the program
appears to have been captured by landlords in empowerment zones rather than by
low-income resident themselves.
The enactment of the empowerment zone program was followed seven years
later by the New Market Tax Credit.27 That program provides a tax credit for
investments in high-poverty communities that are channeled through so-called
“community development entities,” or CDEs. The tax credit is worth thirty-nine
percent of the investment and is realized over the course of seven years.28 CDEs
must incorporate community members in their governance process (for example, by
allocating a certain share of their director or officer positions to community
members), and they must compete with each other for new credit allocations from
the Treasury Department, which exercises continuing oversight.29 The revenue cost
of the program is now slightly over $1 billion per year,30 and the credit is set to
expire at the end of 2019 unless Congress extends it,31 as it has several times in the
past.
The most recent round of spatially differentiated tax provisions prior to the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act have targeted areas hit by natural disasters. The package
passed after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was the most generous: For taxpayers in
Katrina-affected areas, it temporarily removed limitations on the casualty loss
deduction, allowed for tax-free debt cancellation, and permitted penalty-free
withdrawals from 401(k)s and IRAs.32 Congress passed a similar measure after
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017,33 just weeks before it turned to the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
II.

I.R.C. § 1391(d)(1)(A).
Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Economics of Place-Making Policies,
BROOKINGS PAPER ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 155, 157 (Spring 2008).
27 § 45D.
28 DONALD J. MARPLES & SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34402, NEW MARKETS TAX
CREDIT: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2019).
29 Id. at 2.
30 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 12, at 27.
31 § 45D(f)(1)(G).
32 Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 2015.
33 Disaster Tax Relief and Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-63, 131
Stat. 1168.
25
26
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It was against this historical backdrop that Congress enacted the new
opportunity zone program as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of December 2017.34
The opportunity zone provision effectively incorporates the worst elements of earlier
spatially differentiated tax incentives while leaving out the redeeming qualities.
Like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit and the New Markets Tax Credit, it is
extraordinarily and unnecessarily complicated—almost as if it were intentionally
designed to create more work for accountants and tax lawyers. But unlike those
programs, there is little in the opportunity zone package that appears aimed at
creating more affordable housing or jobs for low-income workers. Usually in tax
policy, there is a tradeoff between complexity and targeting: a provision can be
simple, but its simplicity comes at the expense of narrow targeting, or a provision
can be precisely targeted but as a result it will need to be quite complex. The
opportunity zone program scores an impressive two-for: it manages both to be
complicated and poorly targeted at the same time.
The basics of the opportunity zone program are as follows: Each governor had
until March 2018 to designate a quarter of the low-income census tracts in her state
as opportunity zones.35 To qualify, a census tract had to have a poverty rate of at
least 20% or a median family income less than 80% of the median income in its
metropolitan area or state.36 A small number of census tracts that were not “lowincome” by this definition but were next to low-income communities could also
receive the opportunity zone designation.37 The IRS then approved each state’s
designation between April and June of last year.38
Taxpayers can now invest in qualified opportunity funds, which are forming
by the day, and which in turn invest in qualified opportunity zones. These
investments are eligible for two different sets of benefits. The first is deferral and
potential reduction of capital gains taxes at the time of investment. If I am a topbracket taxpayer and I sell an asset with a $100 gain, I would normally pay a tax of
$23.80 this year. If I put the $100 in an opportunity fund and keep it there until
2026, I can defer my capital gains tax bill until then, and instead of paying tax on
$100, I will pay tax on $85.39 The second benefit comes when I sell my opportunity
The law’s official name is “An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of
the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018,” after the Senate
parliamentarian—in a debatable interpretation of the upper chamber’s Byrd Rule—struck the
more succinct “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” moniker. See Ellen P. Aprill & Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax
Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 100, 125 (2018).
35 See § 1400Z-1; see also Treasury, IRS Announce First Round of Opportunity Zones
Designations For 18 States, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0341
(noting that March 21, 2018 was the deadline for a governor to submit designations or request a
30-day extension).
36 See § 45D(e); see also § 1400Z-1(c).
37 See § 1400Z-1(e).
38 See Treasury, IRS Announce Final Round of Opportunity Zone Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY (June 14, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0414.
39 § 1400Z-2(a)-(b).
34
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fund holdings. If I hold onto the investment for ten years, so until 2029, then I will
owe no capital gains tax on my opportunity fund gains.40
The statute requires that qualified opportunity funds invest ninety percent of
their assets in qualified opportunity zone property.41 Qualified opportunity zone
property includes stock in a corporation or an interest in a partnership if, according
to the statute, “substantially all” of the corporation or partnership’s tangible
property is inside the opportunity zone. The Treasury Department and the IRS
have proposed regulations that would interpret “substantially all” in that context to
mean “at least 70 percent”42—which seems to be quite a stretch of the English
language.43 I would like to know how Treasury officials would feel if a young
daughter or son of theirs claimed to have completed “substantially all” of the
evening’s homework but had in fact left thirty percent undone. In any event, the net
effect is that a taxpayer can benefit from the opportunity zone provision if she
invests in a fund that invests ninety percent of its assets in businesses that hold
seventy percent of their property in opportunity zones, which means that at the end
of the day, only sixty-three percent of the investment needs to go into the areas that
the statute was intended to lift up.
The fact that a taxpayer can claim one hundred percent of the benefits of the
opportunity zone program when less than two-thirds of that taxpayer’s investment
goes toward a low-income community is just one among a number of ways in which
the provision is poorly targeted. First, unlike LIHTC, there is nothing in the
opportunity zone program that appears aimed at expanding access to affordable
housing. A developer could buy a building in an opportunity zone currently occupied
by low-income tenants, tear it down, replace it with luxury rentals, and claim the
opportunity zone tax benefits. Second, unlike the empowerment zone program’s
work credit, there is nothing in the opportunity zone provision that ensures that
investments receiving tax preferences will generate jobs—for low-income workers or
for anyone else. An enterprise could, for example, acquire an existing factory in a
high-poverty area, fire all the workers, replace them with robots, and still claim all
the opportunity zone tax benefits for its investment. Third, unlike the New Markets
Tax Credit, there is nothing in the opportunity zone statute that provides for
community accountability or Treasury oversight.44
§ 1400Z-2(c).
§ 1400Z-2(d).
42 Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. 18,652, 18,688 (May 1, 2018).
43 In the accounting context, “‘[s]ubstantially all’ is commonly considered to be approximately
90%.” The New Business Definition: Why It Matters, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: IN THE LOOP,
Feb. 2018, at 2, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/assets/pdf/in-the-loop/fasb-new-definitionof-business.pdf.
44 A new working paper by Alan Sage, Mike Langen, and Alexander Van de Minne finds that
opportunity zone designation led to a 14 percent increase in the price of “redevelopment
properties” (i.e., apartments older than 60 years and other buildings older than 30 years) and a
21 percent increase in the price of vacant land. Alan Sage, Mike Langen, and Alexander Van de
Minne, Where Is the Opportunity in Opportunity Zones? Early Indicators of the Opportunity
Zone Program’s Impact on Commercial Property Prices 2, 18 (June 1, 2019) (unpublished
40
41

8
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436899

Perhaps the only saving grace of the opportunity zone program is that the tax
benefits might turn out not to be so large. The Joint Committee on Taxation
initially estimated a revenue cost of approximately $1.6 billion over the course of a
decade45—or slightly more than one-one thousandth of the total cost of the
December 2017 tax law. Opportunity zones lose money for the federal government
until 2025 and then lead to higher capital gains tax collections in 2026, when
taxpayers who deferred gains when they made their initial opportunity zone
investments will now owe Uncle Sam.
The revenue cost of opportunity zones could be even smaller if capital gains
rates rise between now and 2026. Recall that when you roll capital gains into a
qualified opportunity fund today, you defer your liability until 2026 and you pay tax
only on eighty-five cents of every one dollar of realized gains. What you do not do is
lock in current capital gains rates. So, if we find ourselves with a Democraticmajority Congress and a Democratic president who eliminate the preferential rate
for long-term capital gains, opportunity zone investors may pay a much larger bill
in 2026 than if they had paid tax on their gains today at current rates.
The second tax benefit of opportunity zones—the elimination of tax on all
capital gains for investments held longer than a decade—also turns out to be
somewhat less than advertised. Section 1202, the qualified small business stock
provision, already allows taxpayers to erase tax on capital gains for small-business
investments held longer than five years. “Small business” in section 1202 does not
mean “small” by your and my standards: the business may have assets of up to $50
million at the time of the investment and still qualify.46 There are, to be sure,
industry-specific limitations in section 1202 that are more onerous than the
opportunity zone provisions. For example, section 1202 cannot be used for
businesses that operate hotels and restaurants, while the opportunity zone benefits
can be.47 But most of the income from operating a hotel or restaurant will be
ordinary income, not capital gains, and will be taxed at normal rates regardless of
whether the taxpayer channels her investment through a qualified opportunity
fund.
Section 1202 aside, there is an easier way to eliminate tax on capital gains
entirely without investing through a qualified opportunity fund—and that is to die.
Stepped-up basis at death applies to all capital assets,48 and it requires many fewer
lawyer hours than an opportunity zone investment will. Moreover, if you sell an
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385502. The authors interpret this to mean that much
of the tax benefit of the opportunity zone provisions is captured by existing owners. Id. at 3. The
authors also find no significant effect on other properties, which they interpret to mean that
investors do not expect the provision to produce future net operating income growth for
opportunity zone businesses. Id. at 2-3.
45 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, JCX-67-17, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference
Agreement for H.R. 1, the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” 6 (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053.
46 I.R.C. § 1202(d).
47 § 1202(e)(3).
48 § 1014.
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asset for a capital gain today, plow the gains into a qualified opportunity fund, and
then die before 2026, your heirs lose the stepped-up basis benefit that they
otherwise would have received if you had held onto the initial asset until the end of
your life.49
I should acknowledge at this point that my views about the tax benefits of
opportunity zones are somewhat contrarian: Listen to tax lawyers and accountants
and you will hear that the opportunity zone provisions will allow taxpayers to
achieve “tremendous savings”50 and “could potentially enable trillions of dollars in
current and future capital gains to be deferred. . . .”51 And of course they say that:
No tax practitioner ever wooed a client by advertising a modest tax-reduction
opportunity that may end up costing more in legal fees than it achieves in actual
savings. There are, however, at least two points on which the opportunity zone
promoters and I can achieve consensus.
First, in terms of scope, the opportunity zones are indeed unique among the
spatially differentiated tax provisions that Congress has enacted so far. There are
approximately twelve times as many opportunity zone census tracts as there were
empowerment zone census tracts: 8,762 versus 728.52 Unlike LIHTC, which is
limited to a specific asset class (namely, residential real estate), the opportunity
zone tax benefits potentially apply to any type of investment in tangible property.
And whereas LIHTC and the New Markets credit are subject to binding dollar
limitations, the benefits of the opportunity zone provisions are uncapped (though I
would eat my hat if they turn out to be in the trillions, or even the tens of billions).
Second, in terms of the amount of attention that they have generated, the
opportunity zone provisions are unique among spatially differentiated tax
provisions as well. According to the LexisNexis database, the number of North
American newspaper stories referencing opportunity zones in the first year after the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was about 33 times the number of newspaper stories
49Investing

in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 18,677; see also Libin Zhang,
INSIGHT: Qualified Opportunity Zones: Death, Taxes, and Other Uncertainties, BLOOMBERG
TAX (Jan. 10, 2019, 9:41 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/insight-qualifiedopportunity-zones-death-taxes-and-other-uncertainties.
50 Barton LLP, Qualified Opportunity Zones–New Opportunities in Real Estate, BARTON BLOGS
(Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.bartonesq.com/qualified-opportunity-zones-new-opportunities-inreal-estate.
51 Glenn Blumenfeld, The New Opportunity Zones Are Great, but Proceed with Caution,
PHILADELPHIA BUSINESS JOURNAL (Oct. 19, 2018, 1:56 PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2018/10/19/the-new-opportunity-zones-aregreat-but-proceed.html.
52 Compare Justin Fox, The Last Great Neoliberal Experiment Comes to a Neighborhood Near
You, BLOOMBERG OPINION (June 18, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/201906-18/trump-opportunity-zones-are-the-last-great-neoliberal-experiment (8,762 opportunity
zone census tracts), with U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., COMMUNITY PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT—EMPOWERMENT ZONES/ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES/RENEWAL COMMUNITIES—
2012 SUMMARY STATEMENT AND INITIATIVES, at AA-2 (2011),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/Empowerment_Zones2012.pdf (728 empowerment zone
census tracts).
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referencing empowerment zones in the first year after their creation in 1993—1,129
versus 34.53 LIHTC and the New Markets credit were barely a blip on the media’s
radar when those programs were rolled out. Spatially differentiated taxation is
arguably having its first real prime-time moment. Alas, given the opportunity zone
program’s deep flaws, it is doubtful that the debut performance will dazzle.
III.
Whether we should lament this result depends on whether we think welldesigned spatially differentiated tax provisions hold much promise. I think they
plausibly do, though my conclusions are tentative and the programs I am
envisioning would take a rather different form than earlier and existing place-based
tax rules.
The case for spatial differentiation must be based on something more than a
redistributive impulse. If we want to provide affordable housing to low-income
families, we can do that by rewarding developers that house low-income families or
by providing rental subsidies to the families themselves. There is no obvious reason
to base the provision on place when we can target the subsidy with precision at the
very people whom we want to aid. Likewise, if we want to encourage businesses to
create jobs for low-income workers, we can provide tax credits for hiring low-income
workers. There is no obvious reason to target the credits at all residents of lowincome areas, who in some cases might not be low-income themselves, and there is
likewise no obvious reason to limit the credits to residents of low-income areas, as
some low-income families might live elsewhere. For spatially differentiated taxation
to make sense, it must be the case that we learn something from the characteristics
of places that we cannot just as easily learn by observing the characteristics of
people.
One potential use of location in taxation that seems to satisfy this criterion is
the idea of place as a tag. This idea is drawn from drafts of a forthcoming paper in
the Journal of Political Economy by the Berkeley economist Danny Yagan.54
Yagan’s idea is as follows: in tax, we are always looking for “tags”—indicators of
need or ability to pay other than income. The problem with calculating taxes on the
basis of income is that income is itself responsive to taxes. When we redistribute
from high-income individuals to low-income individuals, we discourage work and
investment. Ideally, we would have some way of measuring your income-earning
opportunities other than income itself—such as if the IRS could observe your IQ.
Yagan suggests that under certain circumstances, place can function as just
such a tag. The Great Recession swept through some parts of the country like a
category 5 hurricane and elsewhere was more like an economic tropical storm.
Search conducted by Lexis Advance Research on June 24, 2019. Date ranges (search terms):
December 22, 2017, to December 21, 2018 (“opportunity zone”) and August 10, 1993, to August
9, 1994 (“empowerment zone”).
54 See Danny Yagan, Moving to Opportunity? Migratory Insurance Over the Great Recession
(Jan. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~yagan/MigratoryInsurance.pdf.
53
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Individuals in some areas, like Phoenix, Arizona, fared much worse than those in
other areas, like San Antonio, Texas.55 These differential effects persist more than a
decade after the recession began.56 We might think of living in Phoenix at the time
of the Great Recession in the same way we think of living in New Orleans at the
time of Katrina: as a fact out of your control that has affected your ability to
accumulate income. For much the same reason as we want to redistribute to
individuals who lived in New Orleans in 2005, we might also want to redistribute to
individuals who lived in Phoenix when the Great Recession hit shortly thereafter.
This is a way of redistributing on the basis of need—or ability to pay—without
distorting incentives to earn income in the future.
We could use mechanisms other than taxation to accomplish this type of
redistribution, but the tax system has certain advantages. In most cases, the IRS
already knows where you lived in 2008. It can adjust tax liabilities on that basis at
little administrative cost. It can track down former Phoenix residents who now live
somewhere else, and it can distinguish between current Phoenix residents who were
there at the onset of Great Recession and current Phoenix residents who lived
elsewhere at that time.57
To be clear, the idea here is to use place as a backward-looking tag for
redistribution, not to adjust taxes based on where you live now. The idea works best
in the aftermath of a cataclysmic economic event; it works less well if the
intervention is anticipated. Tagging on the basis of past place may therefore be only
a one-time tool. If too often repeated, it may have the perverse effect of encouraging
individuals to remain in the path of an economic storm rather than relocating to a
place with greater employment opportunities.
Another potential use of place in taxation emerges from the literature on
“moving to opportunity.” Moving to Opportunity was a randomized controlled trial
conducted across five U.S. cities between 1994 and 1998 in which nearly 5000
families with children in public housing projects participated. Some participants
received standard Section 8 Housing Choice vouchers that they could use anywhere
that took Section 8. Others received “moving to opportunity” vouchers that they
could only use if they relocated to a low-poverty area. The idea was that if
concentrated poverty generates significant harms, then the families that received
the “moving to opportunity” vouchers should fare better on measurable dimensions
than the others.58
Id. at 2.
Danny Yagan, The Enduring Employment Impact of Your Great Recession Location (Institute
for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper No. 108-16, 2016),
http://irle.berkeley.edu/the-enduring-employment-impact-of-your-great-recession-location.
57 The argument for IRS administration of retrospective place-based payments accords with the
idea that responsibility for spending programs should be allocated on the basis of institutional
competencies. See generally David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004).
58 The design of the experiment and the results are summarized in LISA SABONMATSU ET AL.,
MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIR HOUSING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM: FINAL IMPACTS
EVALUATION—PREPARED FOR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
55
56
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The results were mixed. A decade later, adults in the families that “moved to
opportunity” were no more likely to be employed than the control group, and they
did not earn measurably higher wages. But rates of extreme obesity and diabetes
were markedly lower among adults in the moving-to-opportunity families. Test
scores for children in those families did not exhibit immediate improvement, but
children whose families moved to low-poverty areas when they were younger than
thirteen years old showed significantly improved long-term educational and
economic outcomes. Harvard economists Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, and
Lawrence Katz estimate that moving a child and her family out of a high-poverty
housing project and into a low-poverty area when she is eight or younger will
increase her lifetime earnings by somewhere around $300,000.59
These findings are amenable to a number of possible interpretations, and the
scholarly debate over the implications of the Moving to Opportunity experiment is
far too rich to summarize succinctly. One possible inference is that growing up in an
environment of concentrated poverty produces tangible and long-lasting harms. If
so, then a worthy social objective might be to encourage some higher-income
households in high-income areas and some lower-income households in low-income
areas to swap location, which would have the effect of deconcentrating poverty
overall.
This normative claim is tentative because the existing evidence is incomplete.
As researchers involved in the Moving to Opportunity experiment acknowledge, the
experiment tells us only about the effects of moves on families initially living in
high-rise public housing in high-poverty neighborhoods of Baltimore, Boston,
Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York in the mid-1990s.60 And even among this
population, the results tell us only about the effect of moves on families who
participated in the experiment (i.e., who “were at least somewhat interested in
moving and sufficiently organized to take note of the opportunity and complete an
application”).61 The Moving to Opportunity results may be—but are not
necessarily—generalizable to other populations (e.g., homeowners and renters of
privately owned units) in other cities or suburban and rural areas in other time
periods. Moreover, participants in the experiment had limited neighborhood-specific
social capital. More than half of household heads reported at the outset that they
had “no friends” in their initial neighborhood, and nearly two thirds had no family
in the neighborhood either.62 Moving from a low-income neighborhood to a highincome neighborhood may be less beneficial if the movers leave behind networks of
friends and family. And the Moving to Opportunity experiment tested only one half
OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT & RESEARCH

(Oct. 14, 2011),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/pubasst/MTOFHD.html.
59 Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure to Better
Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM.
ECON. REV. 859-60 (2016).
60 Jens Ludwig et al., What Can We Learn About Neighborhood Effects from the Moving to
Opportunity Experiment?, 114 AM. J. SOCIOL. 144, 154-55 (2008).
61 Id. at 155.
62 Id. at 155-56.
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of the household-swap equation: the movement of low-income households into
higher-income neighborhoods. We do not know the effect of high-income households
moving into low-income neighborhoods (either on themselves or on their new
neighbors).63
With these considerable caveats in mind, spatially differentiated taxation
suggests a potential way to facilitate the deconcentration of poverty and the
emergence of more socioeconomically heterogeneous neighborhoods. We might
imagine, for example, spatially differentiated income tax rate structures: steeply
progressive rate structures in low-poverty areas and flatter rate structures in highpoverty areas. Households at the bottom of the income ladder would therefore have
an incentive to move to high-income areas, where they would benefit from the
additional progressivity,64 while households at the top of the income ladder would
have an incentive to move to low-income areas, where they would benefit from
flatter rates. Given the persistent correlation between income and race, spatially
differentiated rate structures could also help to accomplish what a half-century of
fair housing law has largely failed to bring about: it could encourage higher-income,
disproportionately white families to relocate to areas that were historically
communities of color, and enable members of minority groups to move into areas
that have long been bastions of whiteness.
The idea of using federal tax policy to encourage economic integration—and
with it, racial residential mixing—will almost certainly engender controversy. The
movement of high-income households into low-income areas is sometimes
characterized—and criticized—as “gentrification”65 (though note that the movement
of high-income households into low-income areas will almost certainly need to occur
if residential integration along racial and ethnic lines is to become a reality66).
Critics of spatially differentiated rate structures also might argue that politicians in
Washington ought to get out of the business of choosing who lives, works, and
A new working paper by Quentin Brummet and Davin Reed examines this other half, though
results are inconclusive. Brummet and Reed find that that the entry of high-income households
into low-income neighborhoods reduces exposure to neighborhood poverty for original residents
(adults and children) and leads to higher home values for original residents who owned their
homes. Quentin Brummet and Davin Reed, The Effect of Gentrification on the Well-Being and
Opportunity of Original Resident Adults and Children 2, 18-20, 22-23 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Phila., Working Paper No. 19-30, July 2019), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/researchand-data/publications/working-papers/2019/wp19-30.pdf. The authors do not, however, find
consistent effects on employment or income for original residents, nor do they find consistent
effects on educational attainment for original resident children. See id. at 35 tbl.5, 37 tbl.7.
64 Note that zero is not a lower limit on the marginal or effective tax rate. Congress could set a
negative tax rate for low-income residents of high-income neighborhoods so that these
households can better afford the cost of the move and higher rents in their new environs.
65 Michelle Layser, for example, characterizes the idea of “integration . . . as a solution to urban
poverty” as an implicitly “pro-gentrification” objective. See Michelle D. Layser, The ProGentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives and a Path Toward Community
Oriented Reform, WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347401
(manuscript at 48-49).
66 See Hemel, supra note 20.
63
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invests where. To be sure, existing patterns of residence, employment, and
investment are also not the outgrowth of an unbridled free market. They are
products of policy choices—redlining, enforcement of racially restrictive covenants,
mid-century urban renewal efforts, and so on.67 To refrain from place-based
policymaking today is to allow the dead hand of past place-based policies to rule us
in the present.
A third path for spatially differentiated federal taxation builds on the work of
Princeton economists Adrien Bilal and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, who observe that
location can serve as an asset that facilitates resource transfers across time.68 One
way to think of it is as follows: We can transfer wealth to our children by
bequeathing financial assets to them; we can also transfer wealth to our children by
raising them in amenity-rich places like Indian Hill outside Cincinnati, Pepper Pike
to the east of Cleveland, and New Albany near Columbus. Raising children in these
sorts of places endows them with human capital, social capital, and oftentimes
political capital just as the transfer of financial assets endows them with economic
capital.
The perpetuation of inequality across generations is, most would agree, one of
the more vexing policy challenges that we as a nation face. The United States has
for the most part given up on the idea of taxing intergenerational wealth transfers,
though the federal estate and gift taxes remain nominally in effect.69 If we are ever
to recommit ourselves to the idea of using the tax system to achieve a more level
intergenerational playing field, we will have to grapple with the reality that wealth
transfer occurs through locational assets as well as through financial assets. Should
adults who were reared in Indian Hill or Pepper Pike or New Albany owe some sort
of inheritance tax on their suburban upbringings? The idea may seem crazy at first,
but a comprehensive tax on intergenerational wealth transfers might contemplate
this notion.
These proposals are all quite preliminary and I look forward to ideas from
other symposium participants. A robust regime of spatially differentiated taxation
raises questions that today’s talk has only scratched upon. The promise of placebased taxation should not be judged solely on the basis of its past, and certainly not
on the basis of the present opportunity zone mess. We may conclude upon reflection
that the administrative and political challenges of spatially differentiated taxation
render the game not worth the candle. My working hypothesis, though, is that there
is indeed a place for place in federal tax law. The 2017 tax law may have been an
inauspicious start to federal tax law’s space odyssey—or, more accurately, an illfated expedition following a number of earlier forays. But spatially differentiated
For an excellent overview, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (Liveright Publ’g Corp. 2017).
68 Adrien Bilal & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Location as an Asset (Apr. 22, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://www.princeton.edu/~erossi/LA.pdf.
69 On the decline of the estate tax since 2001, see POLICY BASICS: THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX,
CTR. FOR BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-estatetax.pdf.
67
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federal taxation is not necessarily a doomed enterprise. If the opportunity zone
experiment motivates more careful, creative thinking about the relationship
between location and taxation, then something potentially positive will have
emerged from the experience.
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